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The great epochs of our lives are the occasions when we gain the 
courage to re-baptize our evil qualities as our best qualities. 
   —Friedrich Nietzschei 
 
To the best of my knowledge, Nietzsche wasn’t a 
psychopath, and exactly what sort of “madness” it was 
that gripped him is uncertain—we may, in fact, never 
know. Kevin Dutton opens chapter five of his book, The 
Wisdom of Psychopaths, with the above quotation from 
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good & Evil. This may have been just 
an attempt at profound window dressing for his general 
thesis that it isn’t always bad to be a psychopath, but I 
believe it goes deeper than that—and as in most 
instances, and especially in Nietzsche, it is worth asking 
exactly what is meant by “great”. The subtitle of Dutton’s 
book is What Saints, Spies, and Serial Killers Can Teach Us 
About Success. So my first question is, “what do you, 
Kevin, mean by success?” My second question, then, is 
“what exactly (and how) are we talking about [it]?” It 
seems relatively clear to me that Dutton’s aim is to 
combat the stigma surrounding psychopathy; to generate 
a discussion with a view to a better understanding of what 
precisely, it means, its origins, and how it can be as 
adaptive in our modern world as it likely was in the 
shadows of human prehistory. But some of his examples 
(Wall Street trader, Special Forces personnel) leave me as 
cold, or colder, than the popular media image of the 
psychopathic serial killer (in the case of this paper the 
character Patrick Bateman, from the 2000 film American 
Psycho, will serve as archetype). Psychopathy may well 
have been adaptive (according to Dutton) in the Paleo, 





would have been, as it were, a “necessary evil.” I intend to 
argue, however, that the operative word is not 
“necessary”, but in fact, “evil”—all philosophical 
digressions about objective morality aside.ii The discourse 
Dutton creates in his book assumes that the world still 
needs (some) psychopaths, and that we need to recognize 
the functional variety and distinguish them from the 
dangerous ones. I will argue that, conversely, since the 
emergence of complex society has precluded the danger 
of violent death (from other species), and even Dutton’s 
own Game Theory example shows that cooperation as a 
general rule is the best possible strategy, that it is only the 
fostering in contemporary society of what is generally 
accepted as the worst in us (avarice, hatred, 
covetousness) that maintains psychopathy’s 
adaptiveness.  
 
“All human life is sunk deep in untruth”iii: Stigma & The Popular 
Imagination 
I have all the characteristics of a human being; flesh, 
blood, skin, hair; but not a single, clear, identifiable 
emotion, except for greed and disgust. Something 
horrible is happening inside of me and I don't know why. 
My nightly bloodlust has overflown into my days. I feel 
lethal, on the verge of frenzy. I think my mask of sanity is 
about to slip. 
    —Patrick Batemaniv 
 
Of course I don't have my underwear. I'm definitely not 
wearing my underwear. 
    —Raymond Babbittv 
 
     The gap between the scientific/medical discourses of 
mental illness in general and popular discourses is 
variable. Sometimes it is wide, the popular imagination 
projecting a largely inaccurate picture. Sometimes it is 
much narrower, perhaps only reimagining genuine 
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difficulties as endearing or inspirational.  Social stigmata, 
on the other hand, are virtually always negative. The 
sources of socially constructed stigmata are also variable. 
In the case of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), there is a 
small media component; the 1988 film Rain Man (or the 
2009 film, Adam) for example. Raymond Babbitt, the 
titular character in Rain Man, is represented as at times 
tragic, at times comic, but he is always only the object of 
his brother Charlie’s designs, and the recipient of either; 
derision, anger, or sympathy. In the end, the realization 
that Raymond is the mythic Rain Man of Charlie’s youth 
evokes a somewhat “magical” transformation in how 
Raymond is viewed by his younger brother, but Raymond 
is never fully subjectivized—he remains irrevocably 
marked by his diagnosis. It is worth noting that in the 
example of Adam, 11 years later, the narrative has 
changed somewhat—the very core of the narrative is the 
becoming subject of Adam. Nevertheless, in both films—
and indeed likely in all films treating mental illness—there 
is an element of generalized social disapprobation and 
discipline; the social marking of the other.  
     This marking—literally stigma—of the socialized body, 
although often problematic in many contexts, is very 
much a part of sociality as such. To wit, the social is 
predicated on norms. Norms are how we communicate, 
work in concert, and generally cohere in groups. Every 
social species is subject to norms, and those norms need 
regulation. Michel Foucault presents biopower in 1979vi as 
a relatively new form (or mode) of social control; however, 
I claim that biopower is very much the foundation of norm 
regulation in all social groups. Before this gets out of 
hand, let me sum up. The form of social disapprobation as 
diffuse social control is a basic structure of which popular 
discourse is an extension. Popular media both reflect and 
enact the popular imagination vis-à-vis (e.g., autism, 





consequently subjected to the public for social control. 
This, of course, has varying effects in a society where 
biopower is not in fact the dominant mechanism of social 
control. With the inception of the judiciary, hospitals, 
police, and the state, feelings of disapprobation are left 
aimless, and manifest in unfocused, confused pockets of 
fear, which take on the socio-politically problematic 
character we see in our contemporary context. On 
average, people can be mean.  
     Although these films both address the difficulties of life 
with or surrounding autism, they cannot represent the full 
complexity of such a life, and they fail to provide any more 
than a superficial glimpse of the disorder. This snapshot 
leaves a gap where actual knowledge of the disorder and 
its causes and effects might go a long way to staving off 
the “idiot” or “abnormal” stigmata, the misunderstanding 
of socially disruptive or awkward (read: deviant) 
behaviour often exhibited by those “on the spectrum.” As 
David Farrugia notes, parents of autistic children were 
able to combat, and even neutralize, both enacted and felt 
stigma by strategically constructing an identity for both 
them and their children based on medical knowledge of 
their child’s disorder, “a subjectivity that is constructed as 
a different kind of normality,”vii as opposed to the alien 
alterity engendered by ignorance which feeds the 
xenophobic undertone of most stigmata surrounding 
mental illness in general. Similarly, Dutton deploys a 
medicalized discourse of psychopathy with a view to the 
same end. 
     This phobic trend with regard to the popular conception 
of mental illness can largely be attributed to media. “For 
example, one study found that 72% of those dramatic 
characters on prime time television who were portrayed 
as having a mental illness were associated with violence 
and evil.”viii And whether or not media is the prime 
influence, “[s]tudies conducted around the world have 
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consistently found extreme prejudice against people with 
mental disorders. This prejudice manifests itself in the 
forms of social rejection and discrimination.”ix Social 
rejection can take many forms (as can discrimination), but 
perhaps the most common form, at least with regards to 
more “severe” disorders such as schizophrenia or anti-
social disorders (including psychopathy), is a conflated 
fear and hatred. That is, fear which may result in a 
reaction manifested as hatred. Perhaps this is a lingering 
aspect of the universal ignorance of mental illness that 
preceded scientific psychology, before “religious 
explanations were replaced by scientific [ones, when] 
people were labeled ‘witch’ or ‘heretic,’ put on trial, 
virtually always convicted, and put to death.”x This 
method of dealing with non-conformists was not limited 
to the mentally ill; some of the witches and heretics 
executed were those who held beliefs that were divergent 
from the ruling ideology, the Church, under whose aegis 
up to 100 000 alleged witches were persecuted and often 
executed.xi Regardless, the general feeling towards those 
deemed “severely mentally ill” in particular psychopaths—
since that is by and large the what—is fear.  
 
Systemic Violence: A Critical Intervention 
     The representation of the psychopath in American 
Psycho is perhaps the best for examining the popular 
image in conjunction with Dutton’s prevailing sentiment 
on the subject. The titular character, Patrick Bateman, is a 
Wall Street executive who allegedly engages in extremely 
violent acts of sex and murder on an increasingly frequent 
basis. The parallel between his day job and nightly 
escapades is both eloquently and sardonically expressed 
when a model he meets at a night club (who he will later 
kill) mishears his statement that he works in “murders and 
executions” as “mergers and acquisitions” (his actual job), 
and says that she doesn’t believe him when he says that 





sort of work dislikes it. Not because the image of Patrick 
Bateman is entirely inaccurate, but because Dutton’s 
thesis is that psychopaths sometimes excel in the 
contemporary world, I would argue that three out of the 
four main examples of modern functional psychopath that 
Dutton presents (finance execs, Special Forces 
Operatives, and lawyers—least of all) are in fact only 
functional because our current social system is inherently 
violent, and therefore these professions have a place that 
is, not necessary, but contingent on the nature of the 
system in which they function.  
     Slavoj Žižek distinguishes between two classes of 
violence, subjective and objective. According to Žižek, 
 
Subjective violence is just the most visible 
portion of a triumvirate that also includes two 
objective kinds of violence. First, there is a 
“symbolic” violence embodied in language and 
its forms…. Second, there is what I call 
“systemic” violence, or the often catastrophic 
consequences of the smooth functioning of our 
economic and political systems…[S]ubjective 
violence is experienced as such against the 
background of a non-violent zero level. It is seen 
as a perturbation of the “normal” state of things. 
However, objective violence is precisely the 
violence inherent to this “normal” state of 
things.xii 
 
That is, our very way of life here in the West functions on a 
system which visits innumerable violence’s upon millions 
of people; simply to maintain the order, comfort, and 
convenience we so depend on. This “objective violence is 
invisible” because, not only does it generate the “zero 
level” background,xiii but because, for all intents and 
purposes, we are that violence. Dutton’s thesis begins to 
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degrade when we consider that psychopaths are adaptive 
only because there is money to hoard, foreigners to kill, 
and criminals to prosecute and defend. The only example 
Dutton puts forth which is genuinely useful outside the 
matrix of an inherently violent system is the example of 
the surgeon; not quite a cold-blooded killer, but just cold 
enough to make the cuts that matter without pesky 
emotions getting in the way. But this need not be left to 
chance. As Dutton demonstrates in the lab, a transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) unit, aimed at the amygdala, 
“the brain’s emotional control tower,”xiv would make any 
med student emotionally fit (read: cold) enough for big 
league surgery. Well trained, psychologically “normal,” 
medical professionals could be temporarily made into 
cold, “supersane”xv super-surgeons at the flip of a switch. 
     Conversely, there would be no need for cutthroat CEO’s 
or stock traders whatsoever if we weren’t running the zero 
sums game that is capitalism. In fact, it is Dutton himself 
who slips the knife between the ribs of his own argument. 
When he brings game theory into the fold, he shows that 
in general, in a competitive or cooperative scenario 
cooperation is the clear winner. In the example of the 
game theory program tournament, set up by Robert 
Axelrod of The University of Michigan, it is the program 
submitted by the University of Toronto’s Anatol Rapaport, 
whose default setting is cooperation, which was the 
decisive victor.xvi Anthony Wilden takes up this example in 
Man and Woman, War and Peace: The Strategist’s 
Companion: 
 
Rapaport’s program—based on all players 
pursuing their own self-interest—is called Tit for 
Tat. The rules of the TFT strategy are two: 
Cooperate on your first move. Then repeat 
whatever move the other player makes. If the 





cooperates, then you cooperate. True self-interest 
is self-and-other-interest.xvii 
 
Lewis Thomas, whom Wilden quotes extensively, 
concluded his discussion of this example of computer 
modeled behaviour thus: “Taken to its logical, ecological, 
and long-range conclusions, the still-dominant ideology of 
the ‘survival of the fittest’ would inevitably result in the 
momentary survival of a single supreme species,” in this 
case, of a subset (i.e., psychopaths), “followed by its 
complete extinction.”xviii The curious, and very telling, crux 
here is that Dutton reads the results of Axelrod’s 
tournament as a triumph of individual self-interest tout 
court, and individually self-interested calculation, as 
opposed to of self-and-other-interested reciprocity. 
Dutton seems to adhere to a “social contract/autonomy” 
model of society, rather than the “always already social” 
model that his own evolutionary argument supports. 
Wilden’s point is that even in the throes of competition, 
we are acting within a cooperative framework. 
Cooperation is fundamental not only to survival in the 
social context, but to competition itself, no matter how 
brutal or friendly.  
     It may be more than fair to say that the notion that the 
inherently anti-social nature of psychopathy is intrinsically 
adaptive, at any level, is problematic. In fact, in a social 
species, anti-social individuals are by definition non-
adaptive. Conversely, autistic persons are, at worst, 
differently social. All those stock traders and executives 
might find themselves jobless if they woke up in a non-
zero sum society. Likewise, soldiers, including Special 
Forces, would be obsolete in a society where cooperation 
has found a foothold. With no “enemies” to murder—and 
make no mistake, political spin aside, it is murder—the 
soldier’s utility would be lost.  
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     I stated previously that Patrick Bateman was the best 
example of psychopathy for analysis alongside Dutton’s 
thesis. This is because Bateman provides us with an 
example of subjective and objective violence in a mutually 
reinforcing relationship—the wealth and status he enjoys 
enables his murderous drives, and the psychopathy 
behind those drives facilitates success in the business of 
generating his wealth. He is a literal embodiment of a 
“cycle of violence.” In a great many cases, those on the 
Autism spectrum for whom the disorder does not severely 
impede basic functionality, can lead perfectly fulfilling and 
productive lives in virtually any form of society, and the 
eradication of the stigmata which surround them can only 
lead to an overall benefit, reducing social anxiety overall 
by eliminating mental illness sufferers as sources of 
anxiety. But contrary to Dutton’s positing wisdom onto 
the psychopathic personality, there is no reason why one 
should not fear the kind of person prone to, even excelling 
at, violence, subjective or objective.  
 
Conclusion 
Where there is the tree of knowledge, there is always 
Paradise": so say the most ancient and the most modern 
serpents.    
—Friedrich Nietzschexix 
  
     The discourse called The Wisdom of Psychopaths simply 
fails to see that erecting a weak defense of knowledge 
about good versus bad psychopaths is still no better than 
an ad hoc defense, one which—barring mandatory 
psychiatric evaluations including fMRI scans for every 
single person—requires violence—murder or capitalism—
in order to be activated. And what’s more, the objective 
violence doesn’t even count, isn’t counted as such, and is 
in fact the golden calf of Western democratic capitalism. 
We worship violence—and this is not at all a controversial 






continues to be adaptive in certain cases today, is it not 
also true then, that the stigmatic fear of the bearer of 
such an emotional void is therefore also adaptive? Dutton 
is here merely speaking the sociolect of those whom the 
“functional” psychopath can only help. I have my 
reservations as to whether Dutton would look so fondly 
on this evolutionary remnant should the icy banker 
foreclose on his mortgage, or the even icier eyes of the 
assassin were his last vista. He has the luxury of being a 
beneficiary of capital and not a victim; the author of a 
book about, and not a statistic of, psychopathy. Although 
not exclusively, these facts cloud his perception, and 
therefore his discourse is also clouded. It’s true that 
psychopaths have found niches in the world we’ve built. 
And it’s true that we can open a discourse where, in a 
violent world, they can be called “successful.” My question 
is: if that is the case, should we not consider whether 
we’ve built the best world we could? 
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